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Asia-Pacific
Like Feydhoo Finolhu, recent satellite imagery shows that the island is exactly what it claims to be: a resort, complete with seaside villas, overwater bungalows, a small wharf, and groves of palm trees.Malé/HulhumaléChina¡¯s largest, and most visible, infrastructure projects in the Maldives have been on the capital island of Malé and adjacent Hulhumalé. This is the commercial and administrative center of the Maldives. And the government has dedicated a considerable amount of money and energy to upgrading its infrastructure in recent years. The two most important projects have been the expansion of the Velana International Airport on Malé and the construction of the Sinamale bridge connecting it to Hulhumalé. The Export Import Bank of China funded both projects. Beijing Urban Construction Group signed a deal to expand the Velana International Airport in 2014, displacing India¡¯s GMR which had previously held the contract. A new 3,400-meter runway, built to the east of the existing runway, opened in 2018. The expansion also included a new fuel farm and cargo terminal. While there may be real concerns about cost, the project made a great deal of sense for a nation that is so dependent on tourism. The idea of linking Malé with larger Hulhumalé by bridge was first raised in 2007. The former government of President Mohamed Nasheed tried to launch the project in 2011 but it stalled when he was forced to resign in 2012. His successor Abdulla Yameen restarted the project in 2014 and construction finally kicked off the next year. China Harbour Engineering Company was the lead contractor on the project. The bridge officially opened in 2018 at an estimated cost of $210 million. China funded more than half of that with grants, and the rest with loans. As with the airport, there is an obvious commercial rationale for improving transport links between Malé, the capital and site of the international airport, with larger Hulhumalé. The latter is home to a growing number of businesses, residential communities, and diplomatic missions. And Chinese loans have funded much of that construction.Stalled and Cancelled ProjectsChinese entities have pursued other projects in the Maldives. And several of them have sparked similar rumors about potential military access or strategic concerns. But none seem to be underway. In 2015, a deal with Asia Resorts to develop Fahala island on Thaa Atoll fell apart. The project was then reportedly handed over to China Engineering and Machinery Corporation. But recent satellite imagery shows no development. The same is true of the mooted Fahala Aiport project at the same site. There is also rumored Chinese involvement in a project to develop Olhugiri Island. But that is located in a UNESCO World Biosphere Reserve and imagery shows absolutely nothing at the site.Then there was the Makunudhoo Observatory. This project was actually moving forward and might have had real strategic implications. China¡¯s State Oceanic Administration proposed to the Maldives government that the two build a ¡°Joint Ocean Observation Station¡± on Makunudhoo, which is the westernmost island in the country. The deal was finalized in 2017, around the same time that China and the Maldives inked a new free trade agreement. But India became immediately worried that Beijing would use it to observe more than just ocean conditions. Indian officials spent the next several years urging that the project be dropped. And by June 2019, the Maldives scrapped it.The Maldives is small, reliant on foreign lending, and strategically located, all of which raise concerns that China could seek to use economic leverage to extract political concessions. 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