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Asia-Pacific By Amy K. Lehr & Mariefaye Bechrakis
◾Government procurement practices based on human rights and rigorously implemented; ◾Trade and tariff incentives to encourage new, vertically integrated hubs; ◾Investment assistance to encourage yarn and textile producers – both capital intensive industries - to move; and ◾Infrastructure assistance to provide steady electricity and adequate logistics to alternative countries.The United States, European Union, and individual EU member states each have ample tools to deploy in this space and encourage better human rights and environmental practices. These can be used for apparel and textiles or other sectors. They could address XUAR forced labor while assisting with global sustainable development and even supporting manufacturing in their own jurisdictions.For example, West Africa, Central America/Mexico, and Southeast Asia each present opportunities to develop new sourcing hubs free of XUAR inputs while providing decent work and stronger labor and environmental protections, but governments and companies need to coordinate to facilitate and speed such a process. And relevant sectors must develop much stronger traceability systems to ensure that supply chain diversification truly leads to cleaner inputs.SanctionsThe United States has already deployed sanctions against various CCP officials and paramilitary divisions involved in human rights abuses in the XUAR. Many of these sanctions fall under the Global Magnitsky Act, which permits the targeted use of sanctions against human rights abusers. Research shows that multilateral sanctions are far more effective than unilateral efforts. Truly multilateral UN sanctions will not occur due to China¡¯s position on the UN Security Council. However, the United Kingdom and Canada both have Global Magnitsky-type laws to deploy, and the European Union just passed a similar law, potentially enabling coordinated action.On their own, sanctions, much less unilateral sanctions, are rarely an adequate agent for change. In the 1980s, the European Community, Commonwealth countries, and the U.S. Congress (overriding a veto from the Reagan administration) jointly imposed stringent economic sanctions on apartheid-era South Africa. In terms of trade, the effect of the sanctions was limited in the short term: South Africa developed extensive measures to circumvent sanctions, and exports actually rose in the years after the measures were imposed. But foreign direct investment (FDI) took a big hit because sanctions greatly increased the risks of investment. The sanctions highlighted the extent to which South Africa was sequestered from the international community. And over time, the joint position of the Western community squeezed South Africa¡¯s trade while eroding its attractiveness as a host for FDI, proving to be so effective that in 1990, a newly released Nelson Mandela said: ¡°To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process toward ending apartheid.¡± Whether aggressive, multilateral Xinjiang-related sanctions would have a meaningful effect on China¡¯s actions in the XUAR is unclear, given China¡¯s greater economic importance and its ongoing efforts to become less economically dependent on the West. But is clear that even in the case of South Africa, collective efforts were necessary and took years to achieve fruition.DiplomacyChina cares about its reputation. Criticism counts.Governments should raise the issue of human rights in the XUAR in every high-level engagement with China. They should coordinate, taking advantage of safety in numbers, which limits China¡¯s ability to retaliate.For example, although President Reagan did not place human rights at the core of foreign relations in the way that President Carter had done before him, his inclusion of the topic as a pillar in every high-level engagement between the United States and USSR allowed him to make significant headway on human rights issues. He linked human rights improvements with building trust in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.Establishing human rights as the linchpin to bilateral relations produced an important shift in Soviet attitudes. The sustained effort to link human rights to U.S.-Soviet relations caused the Soviets to realize that normalization would not arise unless it addressed ¡°the full range of issues,¡± including human rights. Similarly, human rights in the XUAR should be a part of all high-level U.S. engagements with China, including trade negotiations. Other governments, which may be more susceptible to retaliation, should identify mechanisms to speak in a coordinated fashion, and the U.S. and like-minded countries should pre-agree on ways to mitigate any retaliation that nevertheless occurs.China has shown itself adept at gaining the support of Muslim-majority countries and other emerging economies for its actions in the XUAR. To recreate U.S. leverage in these countries and obtain their diplomatic support, the United States will need to: 1.Reestablish its moral leadership by taking concrete steps to address human rights at home and abroad (e.g., by creating a plan to address disproportionate policing impacts on minorities in the United States and applying human rights standards and laws to allies and foes alike in areas such as weapons sales); 2.Strongly commit to multilateral institutions (e.g., by rejoining the UN Human Rights Council); and 3.Significantly increase long-term development and investment aid, founded on support for sustainable development, to make the United States a desirable long-term partner in these countries. Increasing Awareness in Emerging EconomiesGovernments concerned about the situation in the XUAR can also deploy a bottom-up strategy. They can provide financial assistance to the media and civil society in key emerging economies to encourage them to focus on abuses in the XUAR and prompt public pressure for their leaders to change their positions. Public awareness regarding what is happening in the XUAR can also serve as an antidote to other governments copying China¡¯s approach.The United NationsThe United Nations should serve as an arbiter of facts when mass human rights violations occur, which in turn can help spur collective action. The UN response to the human rights crisis in Xinjiang has been limited, a position enabled by the Trump administration¡¯s skepticism of multilateral institutions, including its decision to leave the UN Human Rights Council in 2018. Beijing has capitalized on the United States¡¯ absence to greatly extend its clout in the international body. China increased its funding to the United Nations and secured growing numbers of top positions there, even as the Trump administration sought to diminish U.S. contributions to the institution. In October 2020, Beijing won a seat on the Human Rights Council, where it will continue to drive its agenda of non-interference, arguing that the United Nations should not criticize countries for their human rights abuses—a position that would fundamentally undermine the UN human rights system.The United Nations¡¯ top leadership has been relatively reticent to denounce China¡¯s abuses in the region, but the organization has not been entirely silent. Its independent special rapporteurs and other experts have engaged on the topic. In 2019, a panel of UN experts issued a ¡°devastating¡± assessment of how China¡¯s counterterrorism law was being used to justify gross violations of basic rights in Xinjiang.UN member states have been trying to expand the focus on the XUAR. In October 2020, Germany led 39 countries, including the United States, in urging China to respect the rights of its Uyghur minority. It was a move that surprised and drew the ire of Beijing. A similar text delivered by the United Kingdom in 2019 won just 22 votes, signaling that there is growing concern about the crisis, at least among Western democracies.The UN High Commissioner on Human Rights has asked for but been unable to obtain free access to the region. Until such a visit is possible, her office could develop a public report analyzing the situation in the XUAR based on interviews with refugees and other sources, as the office has done for other human rights crises when meaningful access was denied. Such analysis by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, as well as continued reporting by UN experts, is important to establish a common, incontrovertible, globally accepted set of facts about the situation.The Group of 7 (G7)Publicly, the G7 has done little with regard to the XUAR. While it expressed ¡°grave concern¡± about the situation in Hong Kong in June 2020, it has issued no corresponding statement about Xinjiang, apart from a brief line in its Foreign Ministers Communique in 2019 voicing ¡°concern about the situation in Xinjiang, the existence of a large scale network of internment camps¡± and ¡°the lack of fundamental rights and freedoms.¡± The United States and other G7 governments should ensure that human rights in China are on the G7¡¯s agenda regularly. Additional G7 public statements of concern would provide evidence of the potential for concerted action.ConclusionAddressing forced labor in the XUAR, and related abuses, will require ongoing, broad-based efforts. Collective effort will also help diminish the risk of retaliation from Beijing. A spectrum of tools must be deployed by like-minded governments in a synchronized fashion, potentially including: sanctions; import limitations and due diligence requirements; incentives for supply chain diversification; consistent and high-level diplomacy; support for increased public awareness in emerging economies; UN reporting and pressure; and attention from the G7. At the same time, some of these tools may prove less effective when deployed vis-à-vis China because of its economic importance and diplomatic heft. Governments should consider whether new tools, coalitions, and strategies are also needed. Improvements in the XUAR are likely to materialize slowly, so concerted and ongoing actions by like-minded countries are vital. Moreover, collective actions and statements will help diminish the risk of significant reprisals against individual countries. U.S. leadership and engagement on the issue is critical, with the caveat that action on human rights in China must not appear to be instrumentalized as a tool in great power competition. The United States must consistently voice its concerns about human rights, whether allies or competitors are involved, to restore credibility. Elevating the voices of other nations and consistently supporting them as they lead on this issue will help clarify that abuses in the XUAR are of concern to numerous actors.Dismantling the apartheid system took many years of multilateral effort. Given the great importance of China on the world stage and in the global economy, positive change in the XUAR is likely to be hard-fought. Governments that care about human rights and do not want the XUAR to become a precedent that is imitated by other nations must prepare for concerted action over the coming years.The above story was written by By Amy K. Lehr and Mariefaye Bechrakis. ![]() What Are the Key Strengths of the China-Russia ... Economic Indicators of Chinese Military Action ... China Is the Wrong Industrial Policy Model for ... Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Central Questions in US-China Relations amid ... Christopher B. Johnstone Joins CSIS as Japan ... China Unveils its 1st Long-Term Hydrogen Plan Filling In the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Five Things to Watch in 2022 Is China Building a New String of Pearls in ... China Ramping Up Its Electronic Warfare, ... A New Chapter in U.S.-China LNG Relations Previewing the 2021 Summit for Democracy China: The Growing Military Challenge: Volume ... The Case for US-Japan-ROK Cooperation on ... China's Commitment to Stop Overseas Financing ... 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